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1. Introduction 
 
The ideal of unifying science has appealed to philosophers and scientists since the 
beginning of western civilization. In the early 20th century it was perhaps most closely 
associated with the work of the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle. More recently 
the desire to synthesize knowledge has been reflected in enthusiasm for interdisciplinary 
research, not least among social scientists concerned at the increasingly specialized 
nature of social inquiry. Critics argue that the current division of intellectual labour in the 
social sciences leaves knowledge of reality in a fragmented state at a time when 
increasingly complex social and environmental problems demand for their solution the 
integration of disciplinary knowledge (Landauer 1971; ESRC 1987; Gulbenkian 
Commission 1996; Sayer 1999; Van Langenhove 2000; Wallerstein 1991; Blackburn 
2004). 
 
This paper contributes to the debate about unifying science by addressing two questions: 
first, whether or not it is desirable, and, second, whether or not it is feasible to unify the 
social (and natural) sciences. My argument draws explicitly on the insights of a recently 
developed philosophy of science known as critical realism (Collier 1994; Archer et al. 
1998; Danermark et al. 2002). Hitherto most philosophies of science have offered 
conceptions of unification through reduction: positivism, by reducing reality to atomistic 
events and states of affairs, and hermeneutics, by reducing reality to ideas and/or 
discourse. Consequently both philosophies are unable to give a convincing account of the 
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historical differentiation of science. By contrast, the conception of unification proposed 
here, which derives from critical realist reflections and elaborations upon the nature of 
science and of reality, is both non-reductive and able to make sense of the historical 
differentiation of science. It was only by returning to ontological theorising directly that 
critical realists were able to underlabour for a more coherent conception of science that 
avoided the problems associated with reductionism. Critical realists established by 
transcendental reasoning that there existed a hierarchy of unobservable structures and 
mechanisms, emergent at different layers of reality, responsible for generating observable 
events and states of affairs. It was the irreducibility of structures and causal mechanisms 
to empirical events that made it possible for them to be identified – whether it be through 
experimentation in the natural sciences or conceptual abstraction in the social sciences. 
 
Critical realists, then, argue that the stratification of reality is reflected in the stratification 
of science, so that different sciences will take different strata as their objects of inquiry. 
However, in this paper I argue that the differentiation of the natural sciences reflects 
differences between strata whereas the differentiation of the social sciences reflects 
differentiation of the objects lying at one particular level. In other words, whereas natural 
structures and mechanisms emerge at different levels of reality, social structures and 
mechanisms emerge at the same level. If social structures and mechanisms are 
ontologically interdependent, I argue, the unification of the social sciences is required to 
understand this interdependence. Moreover the interaction between social and natural 
structures and mechanisms ultimately entails the unification of the social and natural 
sciences and a broader understanding of the term 'society'.  
 
But if scientific unification, in addition to specialization, is desirable, I argue, its 
feasibility is more problematic. Whether or not the integration of disciplinary knowledge 
will be possible through 'interdisciplinary' or 'post-disciplinary' research practices will 
depend on the social and intellectual context of knowledge production; for whilst 
philosophical agreement between members of an interdisciplinary research team will 
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facilitate the synthesis of knowledge, the institutionalisation of scientific disciplines in 
universities may still obstruct it. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin with an overview of the two building 
blocks of critical realism: transcendental realism and critical naturalism. In the following 
section I draw on these philosophical theses to justify a conception of unified science 
before addressing the question of whether or not unification may be realized through 
interdisciplinary research. 
 
 
2. Critical realism and science 
 
Let me begin, then, by giving an outline of the philosophy of science that underpins my 
argument. The term 'critical realism' refers to the combination of transcendental realism 
and critical naturalism as elaborated successively in the work of Bhaskar (1975; 1979). If 
the characteristic starting point of positivism is to ask how knowledge of reality is 
possible, the characteristic starting point of transcendental realism is to ask what makes 
knowledge of reality possible; more specifically, what reality must be like for successful 
scientific experimentation to be possible. Positivists hold that the aim of science is to 
record, through observation and experience, naturally occurring laws, which, according 
to the Humean theory of causation, take the form of constant conjunctions of events and 
states of affairs. In this way positivism restricts itself to what transcendental realists call 
the 'empirical' domain of reality. (Hence positivism may be categorised as an 'empirical 
realism'.) However, the problem with this conception of science is that it cannot explain 
why scientists themselves often produce constant conjunctions of events in laboratory 
experiments – that is, artificially – and why scientists have been able to apply knowledge 
gained from experiments to phenomena outside the laboratory.  
 
Transcendental realism solves this problem by inferring from the success of laboratory 
experiments the existence of a domain of emergent structures and causal mechanisms. 
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Although these objects are unobservable they can be known to exist indirectly through 
the effects they have on observable phenomena. Hence the aim of science is not to search 
for empirical regularities of the form 'whenever x happens, y happens' but to identify 
those particular structures and mechanisms which are thought to be responsible for 
generating such patterns of events. In the natural sciences it is often the case that 
scientists can identify a particular structure, causal mechanism or power (such as gravity) 
by isolating it from external influences. When scientists 'close off' a part of reality in this 
way, the phenomenon observed will indeed be a constant conjunction of events – for 
example the observation that, when dropped through a vacuum, all objects accelerate at a 
constant rate and that pure water always boils at 100 degrees Celsius. Hence constant 
conjunctions of events and states of affairs are only produced and are rarely (if at all) 
naturally occurring. However, outside the laboratory in the open system that is reality one 
particular causal mechanism will be operating alongside many other structures and causal 
mechanisms, whose powers may counteract its own. Hence its effect will hardly ever be 
manifest as a constant conjunction of events. Scientific laws, therefore, should be 
regarded not as empirical regularities but as normic statements; that is, statements of the 
way underlying structures, mechanisms and powers tend to operate. For example gravity 
ensures that leaves fall to the ground but only in the absence of countervailing forces – 
perhaps thermal currents; and the atomic structure of water ensures that it always boils at 
100 degrees Celsius, but not if salt is added to it.  
 
In other words in the open world the domains of the 'empirical', 'actual' and 'real' are 
usually 'out of phase' with each other. Only in certain conditions – that is, in laboratory 
experiments – are they brought 'in phase' with each other so that the existence of one 
particular mechanism lying in the domain of the real can be identified directly with the 
effects it has on objects in the domains of the actual (where events take place however 
they are experienced) and the empirical (where actual events are experienced differently). 
It is of course through applying the knowledge gained from experiments that scientists 
have contributed to the invention of aeroplanes, nuclear bombs and various other devices. 
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According to transcendental realism, then, knowledge of reality, contra the claims of 
positivism, is presupposed by, not given in, experience. The ability of scientists to carry 
out successfully both theoretical and applied experiments presupposes that reality must 
be structured, stratified and differentiated; in other words that there exist various strata of 
unobservable structures, causal mechanisms and powers, which generate patterns of 
observable events and states of affairs, and which can be isolated, and so differentiated, 
from each other. Scientific development, therefore, is an ongoing, open-ended process of 
discovery. Once scientists have identified a particular mechanism operating at one 
stratum of reality, the existence of that mechanism in itself becomes something for them 
to explain through investigation of deeper strata of reality. For example in chemistry the 
theory of atomic number and valency was explained by the theory of electrons and 
atomic structure, which was in turn explained by theories of sub-atomic structure. 
However, although this process is cumulative, it is not monistic because knowledge of 
one stratum may have to be revised in light of new knowledge of the stratum beneath it.  
 
Therefore, a transcendental inquiry into the possibility of scientific experimentation in 
natural science establishes that the natural world is structured, stratified and 
differentiated. But does the social world exhibit the same properties? In other words, is a 
naturalistic social science possible? Now the hermeneutic tradition of social inquiry 
(including its post-modernist and post-structuralist off-shoots) has always maintained that 
a naturalistic social science is impossible. Implicitly accepting the positivist account of 
natural science, it holds that social phenomena are different from natural phenomena in 
that the former, unlike the latter, depend on people's ideas and discourse. Hence the 
Humean theory of causation, the linchpin of positivism, is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for acquiring knowledge of social phenomena. Rather, knowledge of 
social phenomena can only be acquired through interpreting, and thereby understanding, 
the meaning of individuals' actions, and through deconstructing individuals' discourse. 
Causal explanation is only possible in natural science. 
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However, a transcendental inquiry into the possibility of acquiring knowledge of social 
phenomena establishes that a qualified naturalism is possible after all. Both societies and 
people possess distinctive causal powers that make it possible for us to know about them 
indirectly through the effects they have on one another. On the one hand people have the 
power to reason and to act intentionally, a power which emerges from neurophysiological 
structures and mechanisms; on the other hand society has the power to influence the way 
people act, a power which emerges from social structures and causal mechanisms.  
 
What, then, is the relationship between society and people? Bhaskar has specified the 
relationship between society and people in the form of the 'transformational model of 
social activity' (1979, 39-47). Bhaskar argues that society is not the product of intentional 
human action – the error of voluntarism – since society is the necessary condition for it. 
Thus talking presupposes the existence of grammatical rules, driving the Highway Code, 
cashing a cheque a banking system, and so on. Hence in drawing on pre-existing social 
structures people cannot be creating society; rather, they must be either (unconsciously) 
reproducing or transforming it. But just as society cannot be reduced to the actions of 
people, so people's actions cannot be reduced to society – the error of determinism. Thus, 
although the rules of grammar are the pre-condition for talking, they do not determine 
what people talk about because talking, as a conscious, purposeful human activity, also 
depends on human agency. In short society and intentional human action presuppose one 
another as conditions of existence.  
 
Causal explanation in social science is still possible, therefore. Society is the material 
cause of social activity because it is society that supplies the raw materials for human 
action to work upon; while human agency is the efficient cause of social activity because 
it is human agency that makes human actions intentional. Hence, contra the claims of 
hermeneuticists, people's reasons for acting the way they did can be analysed as causes, 
and, contra the claims of positivists, people's conceptions of the activities they are 
involved in provide the starting point for the identification, through conceptual 
abstraction, of the material causes of – that is, the social structures and mechanisms 
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enabling and constraining – their activity. Conceptual investigation is necessary in social 
science because the reality of human consciousness, intentionality and reflexivity means 
that social systems cannot be closed off by experimentation in the way that natural 
systems can. Hence, if social reality is inherently open the chief criterion for choice of 
substantive theory will not be predictive accuracy but relative explanatory power. 
 
 
3. Unifying the social (and natural) sciences 
 
Both positivism and critical realism, then, hold that the method of inquiry in the natural 
and social sciences is essentially the same (the thesis of naturalism). According to 
positivism the essence of scientific inquiry lies in the recording of naturally occurring 
constant conjunctions of events and states of affairs through observation and experience. 
In addition to a monistic account of scientific development positivism offers a deductivist 
theory of scientific structure, according to which an event is either explained or predicted 
by its deduction from a set of empirical regularities, initial conditions, and triggering 
actions. By contrast for critical realists the essence of scientific inquiry lies in a 
'retroductive' movement from the level of events to underlying generative mechanisms 
and structures; and theoretical explanation involves the postulation of a structure or 
mechanism, which would account for the phenomenon to be explained, by means of 
analogical and metaphorical description. However, whereas critical realists realise that 
differences between natural and social objects mean that the method of inquiry in both 
sciences will not be exactly the same, positivists either ignore such differences – the 
thesis of scientism – or simply deny their existence – the thesis of reductionism. 
 
Now reductionism and scientism are two highly influential theses in the social sciences. 
Indeed they underpin the recent tendencies towards 'disciplinary parochialism' and 
'disciplinary imperialism' (Sayer 1999, 1). For example, ever since Becker claimed that 
'the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behaviour' 
(1976, 8) orthodox economists have no longer restricted themselves to the analysis of 
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rational behaviour inside the market; rather, they have challenged the traditional division 
of analytical labour by applying rational choice theory to non-market phenomena – that 
is, to the subject matter of political science, sociology and geography – with the result 
that new disciplines have emerged – public choice theory, rational choice sociology and 
geographical economics. Indeed Fine (2003) has identified a new breed of 'economics 
imperialism' that explains what economists used to consider 'irrational' behaviour, such as 
social norms and institutions, as the 'rational' response to market imperfections. 
 
But the question remains whether economics imperialism is a desirable way to unify the 
social sciences. Lawson (1997; 2003) has argued that the essence of modern economics 
lies in its a priori insistence on the use of deductivist methods of analysis and that these 
methods are ill suited to the analysis of social objects because their use presupposes that 
social reality consists of nothing but atomistic events and states of affairs. In other words, 
a deductivist methodology and an empiricist epistemology presuppose an atomistic, 
empirical realist ontology. In orthodox economics social atomism finds expression in 
methodological individualism, the doctrine that social phenomena must be explained by 
recourse to the preferences of individuals. According to this thesis social structures are 
simply the voluntary creations of groups of individuals and do not possess distinctive 
causal powers. The opposing thesis, methodological collectivism, holds that social 
phenomena must be explained by recourse to social wholes. According to this thesis it is 
the individual who is the 'puppet' of external, deterministic social structures and who does 
not possess distinctive causal powers.  
 
Now critical realists argue that both individualism and collectivism are misconceived 
sociological theses. The transformational model of social activity implies that society 
should be conceived as a totality of pre-existing relations between people (and between 
people and nature, and people and social products) who occupy various positions in 
society (such as university lecturer) and who, in virtue of their occupancy of these 
positions, carry out various associated practices (such as teaching, researching and 
examining). These 'positioned-practices', as they are known, may be either internally or 
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externally related to each other. However, it is only from internal relations that social 
structures and causal mechanisms emerge. Thus, landlords, in virtue of their position in 
the structure of property relations have the power, de jure, to charge tenants rent. Yet the 
fact that a landlord may be a pensioner and the tenant a student is not essential to the 
landlord-tenant relation: it is external or contingent. 
 
A conception of society as highly (but not completely) internally related avoids on the 
one hand the dangers of reification and determinism associated with social holism, which 
implies a conception of society as comprising only internal relations, and on the other the 
dangers of voluntarism and creationism associated with social atomism, which implies a 
conception of society as comprising only external relations. For it should be clear from 
what has been said above that people cannot simply 'create' society because society 
always pre-exists them and provides the conditions for their intentional actions; and 
society cannot be a 'thing in itself', determining how people act, because society can be 
only either reproduced or transformed in virtue of the (un)intentional activities of people. 
Moreover just as society cannot be reduced to the actions of individual people, so it 
cannot be reduced to their ideas and language – as hermeneuticists have assumed – for, as 
I mentioned earlier, all social action presupposes as material context. 
 
The upshot of the argument so far, then, is that society is a relational emergent property 
rooted in, yet irreducible to, human agency. But if society comprises a web of social 
relations, what are the objects of inquiry of the specialized social sciences? Moreover, are 
these objects related to each other in such a way that we might view them as in some 
sense unified? Now I argued above that social structures and mechanisms are the 
emergent properties of internal social relations, and that it is in virtue of the fact that 
these properties are causal that they constitute a distinct stratum of reality. But if social 
structures and mechanisms possess distinctive causal powers that make them possible 
objects of knowledge, so do natural structures and mechanisms. Hence, if each layer of 
objects is dealt with by a different science, we can easily see how the stratification of 
science reflects the stratification of reality; and if the historical order of the development 
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of science reveals that there is a hierarchy of strata, there must also be a corresponding 
hierarchy
1
 of sciences:  
 
   psychological and semiological sciences 
 increasing  social sciences    increasing 
 complexity biological sciences    ontological 
   chemical sciences    depth 
   physical sciences 
  
 
Fig. 1 (Based on Collier 1989, 45) 
 
A movement down the hierarchy corresponds to an increase in ontological depth – that is, 
to the successive unfolding of deeper layers of reality. Each layer of reality, therefore, is 
said to be rooted in, emergent from, yet irreducible to the one beneath it. For example 
social structures and mechanisms are rooted in physiological structures and mechanisms 
because it is only through the actions of people that society is either reproduced or 
transformed; and they are emergent properties of human interaction since the causal 
powers social structures and mechanisms possess are qualitatively different from those 
that people possess. Hence social activity cannot be predicted from, and so reduced to, 
knowledge of human behaviour (social atomism); while human behaviour cannot be 
predicted from, and so reduced to, knowledge of social formations (social holism). 
 
By contrast a movement up the hierarchy corresponds to an increase in complexity, in the 
sense that deeper strata of reality deal with the less complex and so more 'basic' aspects 
of reality, such as different types of particles, whereas higher strata deal with more 
complex and so less basic aspects of reality, such as human consciousness. The layers of 
reality become more complex as one ascends the hierarchy because more and more 
                                                
1
 The exact position of the psychological, semiological and social sciences in the hierarchy is still subject to 
dispute. If the strata are ordered according to the principles of composition and vertical explanation, the 
social sciences ought to be placed at the top of the hierarchy. However, if it is accepted that psychological 
and semiological mechanisms are explained by both biological and social mechanisms, and that 
psychological, semiological and social mechanisms ontologically presuppose each other, the psychological 
and semiological sciences ought to be placed either at the top or on the same level as the social sciences 
(Collier 1994, 130-4). However, this dispute does not affect the argument presented here. 
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
11
mechanisms come into play. Thus social structures and mechanisms are governed not 
only by biological structures and mechanisms but also by chemical and physical 
structures and mechanisms. Moreover, while mechanisms lying at one stratum are 
governed by those lying at all levels below it, mechanisms lying at any one stratum may 
affect those lying at levels both above and below. Thus people may pollute the 
environment, while hurricanes may stop the production of goods and services (Collier 
1989, 48-9; 1994, 45-50, 107-115). 
 
Now figure 1 is a highly simplified representation of the hierarchy of the sciences. One 
might distinguish further levels of reality and corresponding sciences. For example within 
the biological sciences one might distinguish between physiology, cell biology, and 
molecular biology (or biochemistry), each of which deals with a distinct, irreducible 
stratum. But can one distinguish between distinct, irreducible levels within the social 
sciences or do social objects exist at only one stratum? The existence of separate social 
sciences, such as economics, sociology and political science, might suggest that there are 
indeed distinct domains of 'economic', 'sociological', and 'political' phenomena. Bhaskar 
himself offers little in the way of clarity on this issue. He argues that 'the predicates 
"natural", "social", "human", "physical", "chemical", "aerodynamical", "biological", 
"economic", etc. ought not to be regarded as differentiating distinct kinds of events, but 
as differentiating distinct kinds of mechanisms' (1978: 119). However, the question 
remains as to whether predicates such as 'social', 'economic' and 'political' refer to distinct 
layers of reality in the same way that predicates such as 'physical', 'chemical', and 
'biological' do. I am not sure that we can regard them as such. For it is not at all clear to 
me that 'social', 'economic' and 'political' mechanisms constitute distinct, emergent realms 
of social reality. These mechanisms all share the same basic property – that is, the power 
to constrain and enable human agency. In other words they refer to different objects that 
have the same sort of causal power. For example, if we let 'economic' refer to the way in 
which material needs are provided for in society, 'political' to the differential ability of 
people to prosecute their interests in society – that is, to power and social conflict – and 
'ideological' to the way in which ideas are used in arguments over entitlements to 
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resources, then we have economic mechanisms such as the production, distribution and 
exchange of goods and services, political mechanisms such as repression, coercion, 
domination, and subjugation, and ideological mechanisms such as obfuscation, illusion, 
and manipulation. 
 
That these different mechanisms are interconnected, in the sense that they ontologically 
presuppose each other, gives further support to the view that they emerge at the same 
level of reality. For example the landlord-tenant relation is at once an economic relation, 
because it is concerned with the provision of a particular material need; a political 
relation because changes in tenancy law are the outcome of conflicts between landlords 
and tenants (and possibly other groups in society); and an ideological relation because 
different ideologies will inform arguments over housing provision. What we have, then, 
is a set of internal relations, which are themselves internally related to each other, and 
which we may think of as a 'totality' (Bhaskar 1979, 39, 48, 54-55). Therefore, rather than 
view the market for rented housing as just an economic mechanism, perhaps we should 
view it as a social mechanism, emergent from a combination of different types of internal 
relation. In short I am suggesting that we define social structures and mechanisms as 
spatial-temporal complexes of different types of internal social relation (since social 
formations change through time and space). 
 
The answer to the question I set out earlier, therefore, is that the specialized social 
sciences are not dealing with objects that exist at distinct levels of reality but with objects 
that exist at the same level. The particular structures and mechanisms that particular 
social sciences investigate are synchronically emergent:
2
 that is, they come into being 
                                                
2
 One of the reviewers of this paper questioned whether social structures are in fact synchronically 
emergent by pointing out that capitalism emerged diachronically out of pre-existing social structures. 
However, recognition of the diachronic aspect of social formations does not, I think, invalidate my 
argument, which is that social structures and mechanisms are ontologically interdependent – that is, they 
depend upon each other for their existence – whereas this is not the case for natural structures and 
mechanisms, since their relations of dependence are one-way not two-way. Thus biological structures and 
mechanisms depend for their existence on chemical and physical structures and mechanisms but not on 
social structures and mechanisms. The question of diachronic emergence – that is, how social formations 
change through time and space – is still important and it is only lack of space that prevents me from 
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simultaneously at the same stratum of reality. In other words I am arguing that the 
specialized social sciences do not stand in a vertical relation to each other, as the 
physical, chemical and biological sciences do, but in a horizontal
3
 relation. 
 
But if it is the case that different types of social relation are internally related to each 
other, sets of these relations – that is, social structures – may be either internally or 
externally related to each other. For example there may be an internal relationship 
between the market for rented housing and the banking system but there may be only an 
external relationship between the family and the market for rented housing (in the sense 
that the two structures may affect one another without being dependent on one another 
for their existence).
4
 Indeed the possibility that two or more social structures and 
mechanisms may be internally related alerts us to the possibility that a new entity 
possessing irreducible causal powers may emerge. Engholm argues that we should think 
of this as 'a causal nexus, the articulation of a constellational entity, where the various 
participating mechanisms not only form an emergent force, sui generis, but perhaps also 
are moulded by the very processes of causation' (1999, 26). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
considering it here. Working out how the synchronic and diachronic aspects interrelate is, I think, one of 
the chief difficulties facing social scientists. 
3
 Certain authors have argued that social structures and mechanisms are vertically related in the sense that 
some provide the foundation for, and so are more basic than, others. Collier, for example, interprets the 
Marxian base-superstructure relation as an 'instance' of Bhaskar's theory of stratification (1989, 59). He 
argues that the concept of  'determinance in the last instance' is an example of 'vertical explanation', that is, 
of the superstructure by the base: 
 '... at the level of vertical causality (the dependence of one stratum of generative mechanisms on 
another) it is true that the ideological and political mechanisms are what they are because the 
economic (and more generally, material) ones are what they are – and not at all vice versa' (ibid., 
61, italics added). 
And he argues that the concept of 'dominance' is an example of 'horizontal explanation', that is, the 
explanation of concrete events by conjunctures of generative mechanisms: 
 '... at the level of horizontal causality (the production of events as a result of a prior operation upon 
a pre-existing complex of generative mechanisms), generative mechanisms of any stratum may 
play their part, and no one can say in advance what the relative weight of those various parts might 
be' (ibid., 60-61). 
While I agree with Collier's interpretation of 'dominance' I am not convinved by his interpretation of  
'determinance in the last instance' because in my view base and superstructural relations require each other 
as conditions of existence. I provide a full justification for this view in chapter 5 of my PhD thesis 
(forthcoming). 
4
 Whether or not there is either an internal or external relation between structures is of course a matter for 
empirical investigation. 
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It follows from this that predicates such as 'economic', 'political', 'legal' and 'ideological', 
as well as referring to different types of social structure and causal mechanism, should 
refer to different dimensions or aspects of social activity. Lawson, for example, has 
argued that the 'economic' is just one aspect of social activity:  
 
'I cannot think of a single sphere of human activity – from lending support to a 
football team, to listening to music, or even to making love – that does not (or 
could not) have an economic aspect… These and all other activities take place in 
space and time, both of which can have alternative uses. All human activities 
require material conditions… But at the same time very few activities, if any, 
have merely an economic aspect…' (2003, 162). 
 
Hay, too, describes the 'political' as another aspect of social activity:  
 
'Though all social relations may also be political relations, this does not imply 
that they are only political relations, nor that they can be adequately understood 
in such terms… The political is perhaps best seen as an aspect or moment of the 
social, articulated with other moments (such as the economic or the cultural). 
Though politics may be everywhere, nothing is exhaustively political' (2002, 
256-7). 
 
Moreover, if concrete events and states of affairs in open systems are generated by both 
social/psychological and natural structures and mechanisms, the term 'society' should take 
on a new meaning.  As Benton and Craib put it, 
 
'society cannot reasonably be represented as a single level in the hierarchy. 
Rather it is a heterogeneous complex of mechanisms drawn from several of the 
other levels: psychological, physiological/anatomical, ecological, chemical and 
so on' (2001, 128). 
 
Clearly, then, we need a science that offers an understanding of social reality as a 
dynamic, organic whole, composed of configurations of different causal mechanisms and 
structures. Bhaskar's opinion is that this science can be either Marxism or sociology, both 
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of which take 'particular historically situated social forms' as explananda and 'relations of 
production (of various kinds)' as explanans, and both of which therefore require as 
conditions for their possibility 'the special sciences and history' (1979, 56). But if we are 
to understand how configurations of natural and social mechanisms emerge and change 
through time, we need first to have identified those mechanisms individually. In short we 
need both specialization and unification in science to understand social reality. As 
Bhaskar himself puts it: 'if Marxism without detailed social scientific and historical work 
is empty, then such work without Marxism (or some such theory) is blind' (ibid.); and it 
is because Marxism tries to understand social reality as a dynamic, organic whole, that it 
cannot claim any one of the specialized social sciences as its disciplinary home.  
 
 
4. Interdisciplinarity and social science 
 
So far I have argued that, if social reality is unified in the sense of being interconnected, 
so are the social sciences, and that if social and natural phenomena are interconnected, so 
are the social and natural sciences. It is clearly desirable, therefore, that scientific practice 
should take account of these interconnections; that, in addition to specialized sciences 
concerned with understanding the operation of particular structures and mechanisms, 
there ought to be a 'totalising' science capable of expressing the idea that a concrete event 
in an open system is determined by a 'conjuncture' of structures and causal mechanisms 
(Bhaskar 1986, 107-111).  
 
However, the question remains whether a 'totalising' science is feasible in practice. As 
mentioned above Bhaskar's view is that Marxism and sociology are both contenders for 
the role of understanding social life as a totality. I do not have the space here to examine 
the capability of Marxism and sociology to fulfil this role, except to say that, at the 
moment at least, neither Marxism nor sociology seems likely to take on the role of 
synthesizing the analytical results of the specialized sciences. Marxism is still lumbered 
with the charge of economic determinism while sociology continues to fragment into sub-
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
16
disciplines to such an extent that many commentators claim that sociology is now 
suffering from a 'crisis of identity' (Turner 1991; Crane & Small 1992). In my view this 
has always been so, for, right from its inception, sociology has tried and failed to claim 
for itself the study of society as a whole. In the late 19
th
 century sociology had to swim 
against the tide of specialization sweeping across the social sciences. Once economics 
became the science of the market and political science the science of government, 
sociology became a 'leftover science', forced to study those aspects of society which 
economics and political science would not touch (Swedberg 1990, 11). It is true that the 
traditional division of analytical labour in social science is now changing (Ingham 1996). 
In response to the imperialism of economics, for example, sociology, political science 
and geography are moving into economics' traditional disciplinary territory. But these 
'cross-disciplinary' approaches have not led to any genuine synthesis of knowledge; 
rather, they have led simply to the emergence of more sub-disciplines – the new 
economic sociology, the new political economy and the new economic geography 
(Swedberg 1987; Gamble 1995; Martin 2003).  
 
Now it is arguable that one of the (rarely considered) causes of the fragmentation of 
social science is the fact that social scientists, even those within the same discipline, are 
committed to different approaches to social inquiry. For example, within political science 
one finds a range of different approaches to inquiry – behaviouralism, rational choice, 
institutionalism (old and new), interpretivism, Marxism, among others – underpinned by 
different philosophies of science (Marsh & Stoker 2002). In economics, too, a division 
has opened up between a 'mainstream' or orthodox core, which consists broadly of 
various schools of neo-classical thought, and a 'non-mainstream' or heterodox periphery, 
which consists of various schools of thought, such as institutionalism, Post-Keynesianism 
and Marxism, critical of the positivist assumptions underpinning the neo-classical 
approach (Harley & Lee 1997, 1431, fn. 4).  
 
Now if philosophical divisions do indeed characterize the social sciences, what are the 
implications of this for interdisciplinary research? Let me first discuss what 
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interdisciplinary research is. This mode of knowledge production is most often 
understood, I think, as the attempt to combine or unify the methods and/or concepts of 
different academic disciplines that are all thought to have a bearing on a concrete 
phenomenon of interest. For example Berger defines 'interdisciplinary' as 
 
'[a]n adjective describing the interaction among two or more different 
disciplines. This interaction may range from simple communication of ideas to 
the mutual integration of organising concepts, methodology, procedures, 
epistemology, terminology, data, and organisation of research and education in a 
fairly large field' (1972, 25-6). 
 
Moreover most commentators on interdisciplinary research usually have a particular form 
of disciplinary interaction in mind. As Cliff puts it: 
 
'Interdisciplinary research is defined as joint, coordinated and continuously 
integrated research done by experts with distinctly different disciplinary 
backgrounds producing joint "staff authored" reports. It differs from 
multidisciplinary research where experts from different disciplines work 
individually on different aspects of a specific problem and produce separate 
reports which may be published individually or as a collection' (1974, cited in 
Hickman 1980, 49). 
 
In short interdisciplinary research is usually understood as a collective enterprise, in 
which researchers from different disciplines work together on a common subject, and 
from which will emerge an overarching theoretical framework that is more than just the 
sum of the contributing disciplinary perspectives – what Jantsch refers to as a 'common 
axiomatics' (1970: 411).  
 
From the perspective of critical realism this understanding of interdisciplinarity as the 
unification of methods and/or concepts is problematic. Which disciplines will be required 
to explain a particular concrete phenomenon will depend on which causal mechanisms 
are thought to be generating it. Danermark gives the example of 'noise-induced hearing 
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impairment', a phenomenon generated by biological mechanisms (affecting the person's 
ability to hear), psychological mechanisms (affecting the person's experience of the 
hearing impairment) and social-cultural mechanisms (affecting the way deaf people are 
received by society) (2002, 57-8). Now if disability is a phenomenon caused by 
mechanisms operating at different levels of reality, integration through unification of 
method will not be possible because, as figure 1 showed, different levels in the hierarchy 
imply different degrees of complexity and ontological depth. Hence, while it may be 
possible for the biologist to identify and explain the mechanisms causing impaired 
hearing by means of experimentation, it may be impossible for the social scientist to 
identify and explain the relevant social mechanisms in the same way. Moreover if the 
nature of the mechanisms involved is different, the concepts devised to describe them 
will also have to be different, making integration through unification of concepts 
impossible. 
 
The goal of conceptual unification, which most proponents of interdisciplinary research 
seem to have in mind, derives, I suspect, from the influence of physicalism – the thesis 
that the laws of the sciences can be reduced to the laws of physics (Oppenheim & Putnam 
1958; Causey 1977). I am arguing in this paper that an understanding of unification as 
involving reduction should be replaced by an understanding of unification as 
interconnection. In other words unification in science should be understood as the attempt 
to explicate how mechanisms lying at different levels of reality interact to produce 
different concrete outcomes. Thus whether or not a hearing impairment caused by 
biological mechanisms will result in a loss of 'function', such as the ability to 
communicate with others, will depend on psychological mechanisms affecting a person's 
ability to lip read; and whether or not it will translate into a 'disability' will depend on 
social mechanisms affecting how non-hearing-impaired people treat deaf people. Thus if 
deaf people are stigmatised by society, they will be disabled whether or not they are 
provided with a hearing aid and can lip read (Danermark 2002, 61-2).  
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The idea of unification as interconnection is, I think, what Danermark means by the 
'integration of knowledge' (ibid., 61). Thus Danermark states that 
 
'a genuine integration of knowledge requires close collaboration with researchers 
from different disciplines. Basic knowledge about other disciplines or areas of 
knowledge involved in interdisciplinary research is of utmost importance. The 
reason for this is that, in order to understand what is happening at one level, one 
needs to have insight into how mechanisms working at other levels might 
influence the outcome...' (ibid., 61).  
 
But will integration be possible if the researchers have different views about the nature of 
science and of reality? In an earlier passage Danermark does mention this situation:  
 
'One common consequence, when researchers from different traditions and 
specialities gather in a scientific milieu, is that people with different, sometimes 
very different, perspectives on reality meet. In other words, very often they have 
different ontological perspectives' (2002, 56). 
 
Danermark concludes that in such situations discussion of philosophical issues 'is both 
necessary and fruitful', and that the discussion should be conducted 'in a respectful 
manner and with tolerance for different ontological, epistemological and methodological 
perspectives' (ibid.). Now if, as a result of such a discussion, scientists came to an 
agreement about the constitution of reality, integration of knowledge would indeed be 
possible. For example, if a team of scientists investigating disability agreed that reality 
was structured, stratified and differentiated, it would be possible to integrate the 
analytical results of their investigations – in other words to show how the relevant 
structures and causal mechanisms interconnect – because the knowledge they produce 
would have the same status and validity. But it would surely be much more difficult to 
integrate the findings of a social scientist committed to an empirical realist perspective 
with the findings of a biologist committed to a depth realist perspective of the sort 
advocated here because, unlike the depth realist, the empirical realist could never accept 
the reality, and so causal efficacy, of unobservable entities. Similarly it would be difficult 
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to integrate the findings of a positivist social scientist with those of, say, a post-
modernist. At best all that could be hoped for in such situations would be a juxtaposition 
of different analytical perspectives: in other words a multidisciplinary approach.  
 
In short I am arguing that one of the conditions for the integration of knowledge is 
philosophical agreement about the nature of reality and of science. This does not mean 
that scientists have to agree to use exactly the same methods of investigation because, as I 
argued earlier, the methods used (and concepts devised) to explain a particular level of 
reality will be specific to that level. It is always the nature of the objects to be 
investigated that determines the choice of method. 
 
However, one question that arises from a consideration of the philosophical conditions 
for the integration of knowledge is which philosophical perspective should be the 
common point of departure. For example an interdisciplinary research project might just 
as well be grounded in a positivist approach as in an interpretivist one. However, it is my 
view that only a critical realist perspective can provide a sensible and coherent grounding 
for interdisciplinary research because only critical realism can provide a convincing 
rationale for the need for specialization and integration in science. Positivism cannot 
explain convincingly why specialization should be necessary, for if the objects of 
scientific inquiry are simply empirical events, how are we to differentiate them whilst at 
the same time making sense of the existing differentiation of science? Differentiation can 
only be conceived as an arbitrary or conventional affair. The result of this, as Bhaskar 
puts it, is 'a crisis of definitions and boundaries' (1979, 62) – a crisis bound up with what 
was described earlier as 'economics imperialism'. For if the scope and boundaries of 
economics are the result of convention, what is to stop economics imperialists from 
challenging the conventional division of intellectual labour between economics and 
political science? If orthodox economists assume that 'economic man' is rational, why 
should they not also assume that 'political man' is rational? A similar argument applies to 
the interpretivist approach, for if social reality is constructed out of people's ideas and/or 
discourse, the objects of science will be social constructions. Hence their differentiation, 
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too, has to be explained as a result of convention and tradition, and is therefore subject to 
arbitrary change. If, by contrast, the objects of science refer to transfactually operative 
structures and mechanisms, which exist independently of their discovery, the 
differentiation of the sciences can be understood as a reflection of the differentiation of 
reality. 
 
But if the possibility of integrating knowledge requires a facilitative 
intellectual/philosophical context, what are the social conditions that make possible the 
integration of knowledge? I do not have the space here to provide a comprehensive 
theory of the material context of knowledge production.
5
 However, examples of the sorts 
of social relations involved in it will be those between lecturers and students, examiners 
and examinees, researchers and referees, researchers and directors of research, and 
between lecturers, researchers and students (since teaching and learning presuppose the 
existence of something to be taught and learnt, viz., knowledge, which researchers 
provide). In virtue of their occupancy of these positions – and it is of course possible to 
occupy more than one position at the same time – individuals will be engaged in a variety 
of material practices, such as lecturing, tutoring, learning, examining, refereeing, chairing 
committees and so on, so that we have what Bhaskar calls a 'position-practice system' 
(1979, 51). Now the tasks, duties, rights etc. associated with each position may be 
codified as formal rules in, say, a contract of employment, or exist informally as tacit 
norms. Thus the law obliges lecturers to carry out certain duties as defined in a contract 
of employment. But they are also aware, for example, that their professional status and 
career progression will normally depend on the establishment of a publication (and 
perhaps funding) record. Similarly, they also know that it is normal to be appointed to a 
lectureship only when one has obtained, or is about to obtain, a suitable research 
qualification, such as a doctorate.   
 
Considered as a whole the sorts of relations and positioned-practices I have just discussed 
make up institutions – that is, universities – which are themselves related to other 
                                                
5
 Interested readers may wish to consult chapter 3 of my PhD thesis (forthcoming). 
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institutions, such as industry and the state (which provide the monetary resources for 
research and teaching). Now certain social mechanisms, emergent from conjunctures of 
these particular relations, will be directly implicated in knowledge production: for 
example peer review, which defines what a community of researchers will accept as valid 
knowledge; publication, which makes possible the transmission of new knowledge 
throughout the research community; and funding, which makes possible both the 
production of new knowledge (that is, research) and the transmission of existing 
knowledge (that is, teaching). These mechanisms are interlinked. Thus only research that 
has been peer reviewed and accepted by the community of researchers to which it is 
addressed will be published, while funding for research is allocated by the Higher 
Education Funding Councils on the basis of the results of the Research Assessment 
Exercise, which provides an external review of the quality of research.  
 
For the integration of knowledge to be possible, therefore, the social context of 
knowledge production must facilitate interdisciplinary research by rewarding and so 
validating it. However, I think that the existing social context acts more to constrain than 
to facilitate integrative modes of knowledge production. The problem is that subject areas 
have become institutionalised: that is, the intellectual consensus defining the scope and 
boundaries of each subject area is reproduced, and so reinforced, socially. For example in 
most universities students internalise the norms and standards of one discipline (or two, if 
they are taking a dual honours degree). Once they reach research level these norms and 
standards will have become habitual ways of thinking so that they may find it difficult to 
think beyond the traditional intellectual territory of their discipline. Boundaries between 
subject areas are also reinforced by the existence of disciplinary journals, professional 
associations, and the Research Assessment Exercise, which reproduces intellectual 
divisions by defining units of assessment.  
 
Now if the social (and intellectual) context of knowledge production is structured in this 
way such that subject specialization is rewarded at the expense of integration, it will be 
difficult for interdisciplinary modes of investigation to survive. This is not to say that 
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intellectual collaboration will never be attempted; rather, it is to say that it is unlikely. If 
it is expected that lecturers will be subject specialists, that they will research in, and 
teach, a specialty, lecturers who challenge these disciplinary norms may find it more 
difficult to publish interdisciplinary research, and they may find it more difficult to win 
support from colleagues and a head of department to teach an interdisciplinary course. In 
short lecturers committed to an interdisciplinary approach may find their career prospects 
diminished. As Milward and Kennedy put it: 
 
'The university teacher judges his expertise and receives his esteem and rewards 
for the most part within the framework of one subject. His courses and 
examinations belong to the traditions of that subject, his publications are judged 
by other teachers in that subject, he attends its annual conference and, if he is 
successful, he is promoted through a small and fairly familiar peer group to a 
chair from which he continues to organise the teaching of the same subject. There 
are great penalties attached to breaking out of this cocoon into an insecure world 
of fewer peers, fewer conferences and fewer senior posts and the best and most 
confident of teachers is quite justified in looking very hard at what sort of 
prospects the system offers him if he at once casts aside his subject label' (cited 
in Squires et al. 1975, 23). 
 
However, the possibility of publishing interdisciplinary work will vary between 
disciplines since some disciplines, such as political science and sociology, are more open 
to alternative forms of knowledge than others, such as economics. For example the 
journal New Political Economy was established in the 1990s with the aim of facilitating 
the (re)emerging interactions between economics and political science and, to a lesser 
extent, sociology (Gamble et al. 1996). Now while many political scientists specializing 
in, say, the political economy of development or international political economy will be 
happy to publish in a journal of this sort, I am not so sure that young, ambitious orthodox 
economists will want to publish in a journal that was not part of the 'Diamond List' of 
core, mainstream economics journals (Diamond 1989). This list, and various modified 
versions of it, has come to be regarded by the mainstream of the economics profession as 
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an informal indicator of the quality of research in economics. Thus research published in 
one of the listed journals, say, The Economic Journal, will be regarded by mainstream 
economists as superior to that published in non-listed, non-mainstream journals, such as 
The Cambridge Journal of Economics. Now if it is believed that RAE economics panel 
assessors use such lists unofficially to inform the judgements they make of an economics 
department's overall research quality, any head of department who wished to obtain a 
higher research rating is unlikely to want to appoint an economist who tends to publish 
interdisciplinary work in non-mainstream journals (Harley & Lee 1998, 24).     
 
However, I am not claiming that mainstream economists do not engage in 
interdisciplinary work: as I mentioned earlier, orthodox economists have applied 
deductivist methods of analysis to subject areas traditionally covered by political science 
and sociology. Mainstream journals will regard work of this sort – that is, formalistic 
modelling – as valid knowledge. But they will not regard non-formalistic 
interdisciplinary work as valid and will most likely reject its publication. Now if 
mainstream economists regard interdisciplinary work as simply an extension of 
deductivism to other disciplines it is difficult to see how their analyses could be 
integrated with those of other social scientists, and indeed natural scientists, whose 
methods of analysis presupposed a conception of science entirely at odds with that 
presupposed by orthodox economics. This might seem a strange claim to make when 
most mainstream economists will claim to be following the methods of the natural 
sciences – particularly physics. Yet it makes sense once it is remembered that positivism, 
as an account of scientific development, is false. 
 
But if the mainstream core of the economics discipline will be closed to interdisciplinary 
work underpinned by a critical realist philosophy, political science may be more open to 
it because, as I mentioned earlier on, there exists a range of different approaches to social 
inquiry co-existing within the discipline. Thus it would be quite possible to publish 
research underpinned by a critical realist approach and spanning the domains of 
economics, political science and law in political science journals because political science 
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is not dominated by a particular conception of science.
6
 Indeed the fact that political 
science is grounded in so many different disciplines – law, history, sociology, psychology 
and economics – gives it an inherently interdisciplinary outlook. What this means, I 
think, is that although political scientists, qua political scientists, will focus their attention 
on the political aspects of social life, they are more likely than orthodox economists to be 
sensitive to the context in which the political operates; that is, to the connections between 
the different types of social structure and causal mechanism I discussed in the previous 
section of this paper. 
 
Given the way the social and intellectual context of knowledge production is currently 
structured, it is unsurprising that attempts to integrate knowledge in the social sciences 
through interdisciplinary research have not been as successful as originally envisaged. In 
the post-war era institutions of higher education throughout the West have established 
research institutes and centres explicitly designed to encourage interdisciplinary research 
(Ikenberry & Friedman 1972). Little is known about how these institutions operate and, 
in particular, about the degree of integration they make possible. However, Rhoten 
recently investigated the operation of six interdisciplinary research centres in the United 
States. Significantly she found that the research networks in these centres (which dealt 
with both the natural and social sciences) appeared to be 'more multidisciplinary than 
interdisciplinary', so that there was 'more of an inclusion than an integration, of different 
disciplines'. She also found that in certain cases there were 'clear divisions between 
represented disciplines and distinct clusters of monodisciplinary relations' and that, 
overall, there tended to be more ' "information sharing" ' than ' "knowledge creating" ' 
collaborations (2003, 5-6). Rhoten's findings are supported by Birnbaum's factor analysis 
of eighty-four interdisciplinary research projects. Birnbaum looked at how project 
                                                
6
 For example the Political Economy Research Centre at the University of Sheffield organized a research 
project on the political economy of the company in the late 1990s. The researchers involved in this project 
had been trained in political science, law and economics. The research output was published as jointly 
authored book chapters and articles in political science and law journals. Only one article arising from the 
project was published in a non-mainstream economics journal, under the sole authorship of the single, non-
mainstream economist involved in the project. I provide a full account of the nature of the project and the 
output arising from it in chapter 4 of my PhD thesis (forthcoming). 
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performance, frequency of integrating devices, time spent by project leaders on 
administration and planning, and extent of interdisciplinary collaboration related to three 
different academic research context: 'permanent institutes', 'adaptive institutes' and 
'independent projects'. He concluded that overall interdisciplinary research institutes had 
little effect on the extent of interdisciplinary collaboration and the management of 
interdisciplinary research projects. As he put it: 
 
'Permanent institutes do seem to facilitate interdisciplinary research but adaptive 
institute projects do not differ significantly from independent projects. Compared 
with permanent institute projects, independent projects were not found to differ 
with regard to performance, interdisciplinary collaboration, or the time spent by 
principal investigators in assembling resources and planning. This is a surprising 
finding given the argument that institutes should facilitate interdisciplinary 
research. The only significant contribution made by institutes was found to be the 
number of integrating devices provided' (1978, 94). 
 
Simply moving academics out of a subject-based department and into a new building, 
then, will not change the prevailing social and intellectual context of knowledge 
production. If this context continues to constrain integration more than it facilitates 
specialization, bringing researchers from different disciplines together may well provide 
more opportunities for interdisciplinary work but it will not necessarily lead to serious 
attempts at integration. In any case even if researchers were committed to integrating 
knowledge, methodological, epistemological and ontological conflicts might still be an 
obstacle to intellectual synthesis. Sayer's vision of 'post-disciplinary studies', therefore, 
looks to be a distant prospect (1999, 5). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper set out to address two questions: whether or not it is desirable, and whether or 
not it is feasible to unify the social (and natural) sciences. My answer to the first question 
is that the unification of the sciences is desirable. I argued that reality is structured, 
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stratified and differentiated: that is, that it consists of a hierarchy of different structures 
and causal mechanisms, emergent at different levels of reality, some of which may be 
isolated from the others in laboratory experiments. I also argued that whereas the natural 
structures and mechanisms emerge at different levels of reality, social structures and 
mechanisms emerge at the same level. Hence the differentiation of the natural sciences 
reflects the differentiation of objects between strata whereas the differentiation of the 
social sciences reflects the differentiation of objects within a single stratum. Now if any 
concrete phenomenon in an open system is generated by conjunctures of structures and 
mechanisms, whether natural or social, it makes sense to explain that phenomenon, not 
through knowledge produced by one particular science but by knowledge produced by all 
sciences that have a bearing on it. The unification of science, therefore, should be 
understood as the integration of disciplinary knowledge – that is, as the explication of the 
way different types of structure and causal mechanism interact. 
 
My answer to the second question is that the unification of the sciences is feasible only if 
certain philosophical and social conditions are satisfied. I argued that the integration of 
knowledge, understood as the attempt to understand how reality is interconnected, would 
only be possible if scientists agree that reality is structured, stratified and differentiated – 
that is, if scientists share a critical realist perspective on science and reality. However, I 
argued that even if this philosophical condition is met, the social context of knowledge 
production might still constrain intellectual collaboration by encouraging specialization at 
the expense of integration. A transformation of the social context of knowledge 
production will be required therefore to facilitate both specialization and integration in 
science, for both modes of scientific inquiry are necessary to explain reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
28
References 
 
Archer, M., R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson & A. Norrie (1998) Critical Realism: 
Essential Readings. London: Routledge. 
Becker, G.S. (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Benton, T. & I. Craib (2001) Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Social Thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Berger, G. (1972) 'Opinions and Facts.' In: Centre for Educational Research and 
Innovation. Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities. 
Paris: OECD, pp. 23-74. 
Bhaskar, R. (1975) A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books (2nd edn. Harvester 
Press, 1978). 
Bhaskar, R. (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences. Brighton: Harvester Press (2nd edn. Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989; 3rd edn. Routledge, 1998). 
Bhaskar, R. (1986) Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London: Verso. 
Birnbaum, P. (1978) 'Academic Contexts of Interdisciplinary Research.' Educational 
Administration Quarterly, 14 (2): pp. 80-97. 
Blackburn, S. (2004) 'Social Science: In retrospect and prospect.' Graduate Journal of 
Social Science, 1 (1): pp. 167-188. 
Causey, R.L. (1977) Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (1972) Interdisciplinarity: Problems of 
Teaching and Research in Universities. Paris: OECD. 
Collier, A. (1989) Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Collier, A. (1994) Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy. 
London: Verso. 
Crane, D. & H. Small (1992) 'American sociology since the seventies: The emerging 
identity crisis in the discipline.' In: T.C. Halliday & M. Janowitz (eds.) Sociology and its 
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
29
Publics: The Forms and Fates of Disciplinary Organization. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Danermark, B. (2002) 'Interdisciplinary Research and Critical Realism: The Example of 
Disability Research.' Journal of Critical Realism, 5 (1): pp. 56-64. 
Danermark, B., M. Ekström, L. Jakobsen & J.Ch. Karlsson (2002) Explaining Society: 
Critical realism in the social sciences. London: Routledge. 
Diamond, A. (1989) 'The Core Journals in Economics.' Current Contents, 21: pp. 4-11. 
Engholm, P. (1999) 'The Possibility of Naturalism Twenty Years On.' Alethia, 2 (1): pp. 
23-29.    
ESRC (1987) Horizons and Opportunities in the Social Sciences. London: ESRC.    
Fine, B. (2003) 'A Brief History of Economics Imperialism.' Paper presented to the 
Cambridge Realist Workshop, November. 
Gamble, A. (1995) 'New Political Economy.' Political Studies, 43 (3): pp. 516-530. 
Gamble, A., A. Payne, A. Hoogvelt, M. Dietrich & M. Kenny (1996) 'Editorial: New 
Political Economy.' New Political Economy, 1 (1): pp. 5-11. 
Gulbenkian Commission (1996) Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian 
Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Harley, S. & F.S. Lee (1997) 'Research Selectivity, Managerialism, and the Academic 
Labor Process: The Future of Mainstream Economics in U.K. Universities.' Human 
Relations, 50 (11): pp. 1427-1460. 
Harley, S. & F.S. Lee (1998) 'Peer Review, the Research Assessment Exercise and the 
Demise of Non-Mainstream Economics.' Capital and Class, 66: pp. 23-51. 
Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Hickman, R.J.S. (1980) 'Interdisciplinarity: a cutting edge for higher education.' Pivot, 7 
(3): pp. 49-52. 
Ikenberry, S.I. & R.C. Friedman (1972) Beyond Academic Departments: The Story of 
Institutes and Centres. San Francisco: Josey Bass. 
Ingham, G. (1996) 'Some recent changes in the relationship between economics and 
sociology.' Cambridge Journal of Economics, 20: pp. 243-275. 
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
30
Jantsch, E. (1970) 'Inter- and Transdisciplinary University: A Systems Approach to 
Education and Innovation.' Policy Sciences, 1 (4): pp. 403-428. 
Landauer, C. (1971) 'Towards a Unified Social Science.' Political Science Quarterly, 86 
(4): pp. 563-585. 
Lawson, T. (1997) Economics and Reality. London: Routledge. 
Lawson, T. (2003) Reorienting Economics. London: Routledge. 
Marsh, D. & G. Stoker (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan (1st edn. Macmillan, 1995). 
Martin, R. (2003) 'Putting the Economy in its Place: On Economics and Geography.' 
Paper presented at the Cambridge Journal of Economics Conference, Economics for the 
Future, September 17-19
th
. 
Oppenheim, P. & H. Putnam (1958) 'Unity of Science as a working hypothesis.' In: H. 
Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (eds.) Concepts, theories and the mind-body problem: 
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, Vol. 2. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, pp. 3-36. 
Rhoten, D. (2003) 'A Multi-Method Analysis of the Social and Technical Conditions for 
Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Final Report, National Science Foundation BCS-
0129573'. Hybridvigor Institute, 
http://www.hybridvigor.net/interdis/pubs/hv_pub_interdis-2003.09.29.pdf 
Sayer, A. (1999) 'Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies! Sociology and the curse of 
disciplinary parochialism/imperialism.' (Draft) published by the Department of 
Sociology, Lancaster University, http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/sayer-
long-live-postdisciplinary-studies.pdf. 
Squires, G., H. Simons, M. Parlett & T. Becher (1975) Interdisciplinarity. London: The 
Nuffield Foundation, Group for Research and Innovation in Higher Education. 
Swedberg, R. (1987) 'Economic Sociology: Past and Present.' Current Sociology, 35 (1): 
pp. 1-215. 
Swedberg, R. (1990) Economics and Sociology, Redefining their Boundaries: 
Conversations with Economists and Sociologists. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
© Graduate Journal of Social Science - 2005 - Vol. 2 Issue 2 
31
Turner, P. (1991) 'The many faces of American sociology: A discipline in search of 
identity.' In: D. Easton & C.S. Schelling (eds.) Divided Knowledge Across Disciplines, 
Across Cultures. London: Sage.  
Van Langenhove, L. (2000) 'Rethinking the Social Sciences? A Point of View.' 
Foundations of Science, 5: pp. 103-118. 
Wallerstein, I. (1991) Unthinking Social Science. Cambridge: Polity Press (2nd edn. 
Temple University Press, 2001). 
 
 
